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THE desire of celebrity becomes so strong in some men that it often renders them as unscrupulous in regard to the nature of the means, as little squeamish with respect to the character of the result. Thus they as readily burn temples as they raise pyramids, in order to attain the darling object of their ambition. Nor is the sober reason of mature age exempt from the influence of this indiscriminating passion. Of the truth of this remark the officer in command of H. M.'s naval forces on the East Coast of South America affords a conspicuous example. After having contentedly remained stationary on the list of captains for a period of nearly thirty-four years, without seeking to achieve the adjunct of a single initial to his name; this gentleman has been suddenly seized with an irresistible longing after distinction of some kind, and has resolved at all hazards, and without any fastidious regard for public justice or expediency, to improve the opportunity offered by the present juncture of affairs in the River Plate, in order to acquire for himself lasting notoriety. That he is in a fair way to gain his point can scarcely admit a doubt; for even our ourselves are compelled, from a sense of duty, to be accessory to his design, by continually calling the attention of our readers to his extraordinary proceedings.

Having given in our last a brief narration of the leading facts connected with the progress of Commodore Parviz's career since his arrival in this river, our present purpose is to do a general review some of the allegations by which those transactions are attempted to be justified or palliated.

1.—The gallant officer's panegyrist in Montevideo not unfrequently invokes in his defence the diplomatic note of the 16th of December; but the strongest proof that they give to that document an arbitrary interpretation to suit their own views is to be found in the acknowledged fact that it was never officially communicated to him—an omission that certainly would not have occurred had the note alluded to been seriously intended to convey the idea that an appeal to force might eventually be resorted to. Now, this being the case, and he not having had, on the other hand, any previous intimation from home that an armed interference in the affairs of the River Plate was contemplated, his presence in those waters was totally uncalled for; and when he took upon himself to leave the coast of Brazil entirely unprotected from the incessant piratical operations of the traffickers in human flesh, he had no other warrant than the publication of a supposititious document in a Rio newspaper. On a former occasion we have undigressively expressed our opinion in regard to the unwisdom adopted in the genuine note of the 16th of December—a tone rendered the more extraordinary as independently of other circumstances, the note was transmitted at a moment when the war might be considered virtually to be terminated by the complete defeat of one of the belligerents. This anomaly, however, may be satisfactorily explained by the very natural presumption that the mediating ministers acted under positive instructions wrong by impolicy from their governments, and which left them no alternative but to obey. Still, we think it is necessary to be very superficially read in politics to infer from that note any thing but an expression of energetic remonstrance against the further prosecution of hostilities, coupled with an implied interference for the alleged

rights of either party. In this we will allow, the mediating powers were certainly guilty of a deplorable oversight, inasmuch as they forgot to take into account the high standing of one of the governments with whom they had to deal; but we, nevertheless, persist in believing that no one at all conversant with the political situation of the world, can consistently argue that it implies a determination to interfere, if it implies the principle of non-intervention in the domestic concerns of other nations not erected into a dogma throughout all civilized nations—even did not the present Administration in England stand specially pledged to a fixed policy in accordance with this principle—how is it possible to credit that France and Great Britain who continually have their bickerings on the affairs of the East, who are at loggerheads about the right of search, and who can come to no understanding on the question of Spain—how is it possible, even could they consent so flagrantly to belie the principles they profess, that they should cordially unite in a crusade in the River Plate, upon the subject of the affairs of which only two or three years before they entertained such conflicting views? But, irrespective of these considerations, there is yet another cogent reason which forbids the politician to draw the concluded armed interference from the note of the 16th of December. The susceptibility of the United States on the subject of European interferences in affairs of the American Republics is known to be very keen; and the following passage occurs in President Tyler's last annual message to Congress, it is to be regarded as but the expression of his concurrence in a principle which has become one of the constituents of a settled system of American policy ever since the days of Monroe. "Carefully abstaining from interference in all questions exclusively referring themselves to the political interests of Europe," observes the President, "we may be permitted to hope an equal exemption from the interference of European governments in what relates to the states of the American continent." Such being the feeling of the United States government, it is to be supposed that even were England and France so disposed and sufficiently united in views and interests to undertake in concert a war, they would engage in one in which they should have the power that Republic arrayed against them without any stronger incentive than the desire of upholding an intrusive ruler such as Don Frutos Rivera? We think the idea is preposterous. But the correctness of our view of the spirit of the note of the 16th of December is still further corroborated by the known fact that the several applications of the Riverine Envoy to the Courts of London and Paris for redress of the interference were uniformly met with a decided repulse. It is also borne out by what has transpired of the explanations given by the mediating ministers to Señor Vidal when, after the battle of Sauce Grande, the Government of Montevideo was uniformly intended to adopt in order to prevent the prosecution of hostilities. And it receives additional confirmation from the late address of Admiral Cervera de Maissena and the Consul General, M. Pichon, to the French residents in Montevideo, where they distinctly declare that the orders of their government prescribe to its agents the strictest neutrality in the questions now at issue in the Rio de la Plata. The Commodore's own avowed attempt the violent interference given by interested parties to the note of the 16th of December has set at naught the authority of H. M.'s government in the person of their representative, and all the acts of aggression he has committed under the plea

of such interpretation are so many flagrant breaches of official duty which, whilst they defeat the very object the government had in view on interposing their mediating offices, seriously compromise his country's dignity, and render him a fit subject for the infliction of that chastisement which is the desert of every unfaithful or incapable servant of the Crown.

2.—There are not wanting other eulogists of the Commodore's, who, without defending the hostile construction of the note of the 16th of December, maintain that the standing he took at the outset in regard to Admiral Brown is justified by the principles of English law. As far as the Foreign Enlistment Act is concerned this assertion is, as we have before clearly shown, absolutely unfounded; and although some doctrine may be held in theory by some writers, it is totally discarded in practice by the British government as inconsistent with the law and usages of nations. An attempt was, indeed, made to make it prevail during the last war with the United States, but was soon abandoned from a conviction of its unreasonableness as of its impracticability. And though the attention of Parliament has been frequently called of late years to the fact that the United States navy is chiefly manned by British born subjects, the idea of reviving a doctrine now obsolete has never been mooted—the wisdom of the Legislature being directed to the more worthy object of devising a remedy for the evils in the adoption of measures computed to be the claims of justice and the natural rights of man. Nor could a contrary course be pursued without manifest contradiction, when it is remembered that England herself encourages the enlistment of the natives of other countries into the Army; and that an act of parliament has been renewed in the present reign, empowering Her Majesty to confer on foreigners the several ranks of field and general officers, as far, we believe, as that of Lieut. General. But what, above all, renders Commodore Parviz's conduct in this respect most unpardonable is the important fact, that the rank of Admiral Brown, in the Argentine navy, had been for several years previous formally acknowledged by the British Admiralty itself.

3.—Two reasons are assigned by the Commodore's admirers in support of his refusal to acknowledge the right of the Argentine Government to place an interdiction on the introduction by water of provisions and munitions of war into the besieged town of Montevideo. As might be expected, the vindicators of this high-handed determination manifest a total disregard for the fact that the right of the Argentine Government has been formally admitted by the Representatives of England and France; and, that in return for the consent of the latter to waive still further the full assertion of such right, in order to favour as much as possible neutral interests, the latter had pledged the Commodore of the naval forces of their respective nations to the strictest observance of the interdiction so modified. The predicament, therefore, in which the British Minister is placed with regard to the Government near which he is accredited, through the non-fulfillment of an engagement thus solemnly contracted, for no other reason than the perversity of the naval commander, must strike every impartial observer as the most humiliating and unheard of. But let us see what plausible means are brought forward to gild over such an unparalleled conduct.

The first is the assumption that Great Britain, though professing principles giving the pre-eminence to the right inherent to the belligerent character, is averse to allowing to the South