

British Packet

AND

ARGENTINE NEWS.

[No. 993.]

BUENOS AYRES, SATURDAY, AUGUST 30th, 1845.

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BUENOS AYRES.

The outrageous proceedings of the naval forces of Great Britain and France in this river, have at last provoked a retaliatory measure on the part of the Argentine Government, and a decree to the following effect has been published:—

"Buenos Ayres, August 27, 1845.

"The Government of Buenos Ayres, &c.

"In consequence of the offensive and hostile proceedings of the naval forces of H. B. M. and of H. M. the King of the French against those of the Argentine Confederation, and their successive aggressions against the Republic, and in precaution of the consequences that may ensue, which the Government is sincerely desirous of averting, it has resolved and decreed:—

"Art. 1.—All kind of communication, direct or indirect, with the vessels of war of H. B. M. and of H. M. the King of the French in this port, in those of the province and on its coasts, and in the ports and on the coasts of the Republic, is, for the present, and until otherwise ordained, prohibited.

"Art. 2.—Any person contravening the foregoing resolution shall suffer the penalties which the Government may deem proper to inflict, according to the circumstances of the case."

On perusing the above decree, the following proclamation issued by President Jefferson, shortly after the attack on the U. S. frigate *Cheapeake* by the British man-of-war *Leopard*, on the 22nd of June, 1807, off the Capes of Virginia, will immediately occur to the minds of many of our readers:—

"At length a deed, transcending all we have hitherto seen or suffered, brings the public sensibility to a necessary crisis, and our forbearance to a necessary pause. A frigate of the United States, trusting to a state of peace, and leaving her harbour on a distant service, has been surprised and attacked by a British vessel of superior force, one of a squadron then lying in our waters and covering the transaction, and has been disabled from service, with the loss of a number of men killed and wounded. This enormity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause, but was committed with the avowed purpose of taking by force, from a ship of war of the United States, a part of her crew, and that no circumstance might be wanting to mark its character, it had been previously ascertained that the seamen were native citizens of the United States. Having effected his purpose, he returned to an anchor with his squadron within our jurisdiction. Hospitality under such circumstances ceases to be a duty; and a continuance of it, with such uncontrolled abuses, would tend only by multiplying injuries and irritations, to bring on a rupture between the two nations. The extreme resort is equally opposed to the interests of both; as it is to assurances of the most friendly dispositions on the part of the British Government, in the midst of which the outrage has been committed. In this light the subject cannot but present itself to that government, and strengthen the motives to an honorable reparation of the wrong which has been done, and to that effectual control of its naval commanders, which alone can justify the government of the United States in the exercise of those hospitalities it is now constrained to discontinue. In consideration of these circumstances and of the right of every nation to regulate its own police, to provide for its peace and for the safety of its citizens, and consequently to refuse the admission of armed vessels into its harbours or waters, either in such numbers or of such descriptions, as are inconsistent with these, or with the maintenance of the authority of the laws, I have thought proper in pursuance of the authorities specially given by law, to issue this my PROCLAMATION, hereby requiring all armed vessels bearing commissions under the Government of Great Britain, now within the harbours or waters of the United States, immediately and without any delay to depart from the seas, and interdicting the entrance of all the said harbours and waters to the said armed vessels, and to all others bearing commissions under the authority of the British Government.

"And if the said vessels, or any of them, shall fail to depart as aforesaid, or if they or any others, so indicted, shall hereafter enter the harbours or waters aforesaid, I do in that case forbid all intercourse with them or any of them, their officers or crews, and do prohibit all supplies and aids from being furnished to them, or any of them.

"And I do declare and make known, that if any person from, or within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, shall afford any aid to any such vessel, contrary to the prohibition contained in this Proclamation, either in repairing any such vessel, or in furnishing her, her officers

or crew, with supplies of any kind, or in any manner whatsoever, or if any pilot shall assist in navigating any of the said armed vessels, unless it be for the purpose of carrying them in the first instance, beyond the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, or unless it be in the case of a vessel forced by distress, or charged with public despatches as hereinafter provided for, such person or persons shall, on conviction, suffer all the pains and penalties by the laws provided for such offences."

AFFAIRS OF THE RIVER PLATE.—MISSION OF MR. OUSELY AND BARON DEFFAUDIS.—ANGLO-FRENCH INTERVENTION. (I)

On the 6th of January last, the Argentine Minister at the Court of London, having received information of a project of intervention set on foot by the Government of Brazil, to be undertaken in conjunction with those of England and France, solicited and obtained an interview and explanations from Lord Aberdeen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of H. B. M.

The Argentine Minister stated that he was well aware that Viscount d'Abantes, the Brazilian Envoy, had proposed this intervention to the Cabinets of London and Paris, and explained to Lord Aberdeen the reasons of justice and of general interest which opposed such interferences.

Lord Aberdeen, not denying the propositions made by the Brazilian Government, assured the Argentine Minister that the British Government had not encouraged or accepted them—adding that one thing was certain, they desired peace in the River Plate, and were determined to have recourse to every efficacious and practicable means in order to its speedy attainment, for which purpose they were about to dispatch a new Minister to the Argentine Confederation in the person of Mr. Ousely.

On the day of his departure, 21st February last, the Argentine Minister in London was urgently invited by Lord Aberdeen to a conference. His Lordship stated that he had requested his attendance to inform him, in order that he might immediately transmit the same to the Argentine Government—that a variation had taken place in the affair of mediation. In explanation Lord Aberdeen said, that in consequence of certain considerations which had occurred, H. M.'s Government had determined to make the negotiation for peace in the River Plate by themselves, without waiting for the French Government or that of Brazil, not because the latter were averse to join in the affair, or there existed any diversity of opinion, but as secret ambitious designs were imputed to the Government of France and that of Brazil, the Government of H. B. M., who had no such views, thought they would be better listened to when acting alone, and that for this reason they had given instructions to Mr. Ousely to present himself to the Government of Buenos Ayres, and proceed to treat without waiting the arrival of the French and Brazilian Ministers who would arrive afterwards. His Lordship repeated the declaration he had formerly made, that the Government of H. B. M. were most anxious for the restoration of peace in the River Plate, by whatever means and sacrifices, exhausting in the first place every effort of friendship and reason, without, however, excluding compulsion, should such an alternative be necessary in the end. He declared that they would defend the Independence of the Oriental Republic against France and Brazil, as well as against Buenos Ayres: that in order to remove any appearance of menace and to avoid irritation, Commodore Purvis should be removed, and another officer in a frigate appointed to the station, who would use in the extreme case, which he trusted would not occur, coercive measures, under the direction of Mr. Ousely, who had full powers. His Lordship added that he had the greatest confidence in H. E. General Rosas, and thought him the only man capable of governing these countries with firmness and prudence.

(1) This historical sketch is a literal translation from the *Gaceta*, except in the cases where we insert the text of the documents quoted.

One of the first steps of Mr. Ousely, on his arrival at Rio Janeiro, was to wait on the Argentine Minister, whom he clearly gave to understand that the Governments of England and France eagerly wished to see the war in the River Plate at an end. He said he felt an earnest desire in unison with his instructions to find sympathies and concurrence in H. E. General Rosas, of whose character and principles he had formed a just idea; and that should H. E., without stain on the honor or the rights of the Argentine Confederation, listen to pacific measures he believed that the solution of the question would be easy and advantageous for both countries, but obstacles thrown in the way would more complicate the affair.

On the 14th April, Mr. Ousely invited the Argentine Minister at the Court of Rio Janeiro to a private interview. The explanations and assurances given by Mr. Ousely in explicit and amicable terms were to this purport:—That at the time of his appointment the English Ministry had determined on an armed intervention in the River Plate; that he (Mr. Ousely) had many reasons to believe that the French Government had laboured most strenuously to bring over the British Cabinet to intervention: that he had had conferences in Paris with M. Guizot, and had spoken with the King: that he had represented to them the serious consequences which a negotiation by violent measures might produce, and how preferable it would be to try first every pacific mode: that from these conferences he had inferred that the French Government wished that England should appear by its side in the intervention, in order to share the odium of a measure taken, it was said, for the interests of humanity and of the commerce of the world, but which, in reality, was nothing more, on the part of the French Ministry, than a trick, for the purpose of silencing the opposition, that he thought that a joint or separate intervention would always be a bad precedent for England herself, because she well knew the present tendency of French policy in Polynesia and Oyoapoc: that although the intentions of France towards Montevideo could not yet be exactly known, England ought not to be deprived, by an unnecessary intervention, of the right of restraining the intervention of other Powers in detriment of the common interests: that he reprobated the captious maxim of Talleyrand, that non-intervention in the affairs of other nations was the general rule, and intervention the exception: that he considered it improper that England should bind herself with France in such a manner as to disable her from acting by herself in the affairs of the River Plate, should her interests call for separation: that on his return from Paris to London he found Lord Aberdeen of a different opinion than at the time of his departure, and determined to procure by a direct negotiation with H. E. General Rosas, the solution of the question of the Republic of the Uruguay, counting on meeting with every facility from him, when convinced that neither the rights nor immunities of the Argentine Republic as a sovereign independent State would be impaired: that his instructions were founded on these friendly principles which he should employ in preference both from duty and conviction: that any act of violence exercised by the strong against the weak, sooner or later was felt as a serious evil by those who practised it: that he reckoned for the fulfilment of the object of his mission on the penetrating mind of General Rosas, and the circumspection of his principles, but if he was disappointed in these expectations the question would become seriously complicated.

The Argentine Minister interrupted Mr. Ousely, to ask him what was the question at issue!—for England having acknowledged the war of the Republic against the ruthless, devastating, Unitarian faction of Rivera, and his abettors, to be just, inasmuch as the rights of the Confederation to employ the means of a legitimate belligerent had been respected, he did not comprehend the precise object of the negotiation in train.

Mr. Ouseley replied that the object was to accelerate the pacification of the Banda Oriental, in concert with General Rosas, not only from the injury caused to commerce in general from the duration of the war, but because this might afford a pretext to other ambitions, that the effect caused in Europe, by the narration of some events (to which he referred minutely, observing that he considered them exaggerated, and that they made no impression on his mind) had induced the Government of England to procure by reasonable demonstrations a cessation of the evils, persuaded also of the advantages which would accrue to the Argentine Republic from peace.

The Argentine Minister remarked that that peace was impossible, without the complete destruction of the bandits headed by Rivera, who had been left powerless since the battle of the 27th of March—that the question became reduced to the force in Montevideo—that President Oribe could not be denied the right to occupy that town—that, if possessed of it, and anarchy entirely suffocated, the Argentine army evacuated the Banda Oriental, no reason could be involved by any foreign power to interfere in the affairs of the Rio de la Plata.

Mr. Ouseley asked the Argentine Minister if he really thought that the forces of Buenos Ayres would leave the Banda Oriental at liberty.

The Argentine Minister replied that he ever placed implicit faith in the engagements contracted by General Rosas, both individually and officially; that treaties existed which guaranteed the independence of the Republic of Uruguay, and that he would not insult the character of General Rosas with the supposition that he would break them.

Mr. Ouseley observed that the case became very different when those treaties remained standing.

In the course of the conference the Argentine Minister demonstrated to him, that even should England by herself repeat the mediation of 1842, it would be on the presumption that two contending parties existed, whereas only one now remained in the field, since the destruction of the ruthless unitarian Rivera, and there were therefore no opposing parties for the interposition of strangers, unless they recognised in the motley crew which oppressed Montevideo, representation and category sufficient to command the respect of the mediators, and place them on an equality of rights with the legal Government of the Argentine Confederation, and with the universality of the Republic of the Uruguay.

Mr. Ouseley did not fail to express himself in a manner which evinced the miserable opinion he had of Rivera, and the so-called Government of Montevideo, but he seemed to wish to be informed if General Rosas would refuse an amnesty to the compromised Argentines and Orientals in Montevideo, who might wish to proceed to Buenos Ayres; and he added that he perfectly comprehended the wish of General Rosas to see some of his influential adversaries removed far from him, in which he was completely right.

The Argentine Minister replied that he had seen numerous violent enemies of H. E. General Rosas, return to their country and enjoy in it the same security and protection as the most ardent federalists, without there being required of those individuals any other condition than obedience to the law and respect for public order; that he could assure him that the doors of the Republic were open to those who might wish to return to its bosom, resolved not to disturb social principles; that General Rosas had not even repelled his most mortal enemies, and that although he thought that some of those in Montevideo ought for a period to be an exception to this rule, he did not conceive himself capable of judging of the ulterior policy of the Government after the taking of that town, and only mentioned this example of his magnanimity.

Mr. Ouseley appeared to be well satisfied with this explanation, and protesting anew that it was not the intention of England to deprive the Confederation of its rights, declared that it had been reported that the British Government intended to open the navigation of the rivers of the interior by force, but that at present they had no such idea, and it would not be him, (Mr. Ouseley,) who, with pistol in hand, would impose conditions on the Argentine Government.

Mr. Ouseley, dwelling on the designs which the French Government might perhaps display in regard to Montevideo, if a pretext were afforded it, discoursed upon the position of H. M. Louis Philippe and his Ministry, obliged as they were to divert the inquietude of the nation. He cited Algiers, Mexico, the blockade of the Plata, Otaheite, Morocco, &c. He alluded also to the protectorate solicited by Montevideo, and to the importance attached to this measure in France; and did not conceal that perhaps some one might be disposed to undertake it, if a pre-
sence could be found to save appearances, holding up the fact of an efficacious permanent protection in favour of French residents in Montevideo, as a

proof of the preponderance of France and of the ability of her present Cabinet—and eulogising the personal character of H. M. Louis Philippe and of M. Guizot, he nevertheless considered them to be placed on a volcano, and that at times it was impossible for them to restrain the impulse of public feeling; he likewise remarked that M. Thiers had in the Chamber denominated Montevideo *our colony* in the River Plate.

Mr. Ouseley did not allude to the Government of Brazil except when the Argentine Minister inquired if he had had any conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire. Mr. Ouseley replied in the negative, stating that he had not spoken with Señor Ernesto on the affairs of the River Plate, except accidentally on the day that that gentleman visited him, and that he had been requested by Lord Aberdeen to treat the Government of Brazil with cordiality, if, on his arrival, the difficulties of the British Legation at this Court had ceased, but informed of the actual situation of things he had kept himself aloof.

On the 15th April last, Mr. Ouseley called at the house of the Argentine Minister in Rio Janeiro, and commencing another conference declared to him that he had fresh motives to suspect that France had some concealed project respecting Montevideo which might place things in a critical situation; that he earnestly recommended the Argentine Government and Señor Oribe to avoid with the greatest care any step which might serve as a pretext to Rear-Admiral Lainez to take possession of the city of Montevideo: that he believed instructions direct for the River Plate had been sent from France, and feared a new Minister had been appointed: that he knew French forces were preparing in some of the ports destined to the River Plate; that he was desirous of coming peacefully to an understanding with H. E. General Rosas; that he would not go to the River Plate as the representative of an armed intervention; and that nothing would give him more pleasure than for H. E. to make some spontaneous proposition, so that not a shadow of foreign coercion might appear.

The Argentine Minister asked what proposition would meet the end proposed; Mr. Ouseley without formally expressing it, sufficiently indicated that he referred to an explicit act by which the independence of the Banda Oriental might be secured.

The Argentine Minister then proposed two hypotheses:—first, that President Oribe had taken the city; the second that French forces had previously occupied it under the title of protectorship, or any other pretext.

Mr. Ouseley stated, that in the first hypothesis, from the moment it was seen that the Argentine Government was disposed to withdraw its army in a given time, leaving the Banda Oriental mistress of her own destiny, he would have nothing to do, even should the Oriental authority have to combat its domestic enemies until the re-establishment of order; for, if England and France interposed for the re-establishment of peace, it would be only in use of the right they conceived they possessed from the conventions of 1823 and 1840, so as to preserve the political existence of the Oriental Republic, without England claiming thereby an intervention in the domestic affairs of that State; giving likewise to understand the propriety that the election of Supreme Chief should fall on another person than General Oribe, but without designating whom or enlarging on this topic.

As regarded the occupation of Montevideo by French forces, Mr. Ouseley very formally declared, that if he did not receive other instructions from his Court, he would not consent thereto, and hoped that his Government would likewise refuse their consent.

Mr. Ouseley sealed his amicable declarations and assurances by giving the Argentine Minister some articles of his instructions to peruse, in which he was ordered to give express assurances, that England was not impelled by ambitious views; to propose pacific mediation; ever to consider in the Argentine Government the rights of a legitimate Government, recognised as independent by Great Britain; to guard himself from showing partiality to either of the contending parties; to solicit an amnesty in favour of those politically compromised; to take care not to wound the susceptibility of the nation; to make it be understood that England acted in consequence of her right to endeavour to secure the preservation of the independence of the Republic of the Uruguay; and to interest himself to alleviate the evils of war by means of the application of the rules observed in civilized nations.

In fine, Mr. Ouseley assured the Argentine Minister, that the other articles of his instructions were framed in the same spirit.

Such were the circumstances which preceded his arrival in Buenos Ayres at the end of April. His credentials, his official language at the audience of reception, and his declared sentiments, were then unreservedly and entirely friendly.

On the 10th May last he commenced his conferences with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a character altogether confidential. He manifested in the most friendly manner, that the views of the British Government were to bring about a peace, without the concurrence of the French Minister, whose arrival was expected; and he renewed the same declarations which he had made to the Argentine Minister at the Court of Rio Janeiro. He signified, also, his desires to prevent those difficulties which a new associate might occasion, and he therefore requested that the time should be improved for the arrangement of a question whose solution he did not conceive to be difficult, and offered moreover to present an abstract of the various points of his instructions.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs evinced the same confidential feeling, informing him of the views of the Argentine Government, in which the British Minister fully concurred, strongly condemning the conduct of the French Admiral, and the Commander of the English naval forces off Montevideo, for not acknowledging the blockade, and expressed his determination to make it be acknowledged, and his thorough convictions in opposition to any idea of intervention in the affairs of the Plata.

Notwithstanding these explanations and friendly assurances, to which the Argentine Government with the best feeling and most cordial friendship sincerely corresponded, the British Minister, on the 12th of May, presented a memorandum so unexpected, and of such a nature, that it greatly changed the pacific and conciliatory position he had hitherto announced and reiterated. It is as follows:—

I am instructed to make in the most friendly spirit, an amicable representation to the Government to which I have the honor of being accredited, in truly candid and conciliatory terms, of the critical position in which a refusal to listen to such representations have in effect placed it. It is unnecessary to refer to the measures that have—if friendly overtures should unfortunately be rejected—been resolved upon—this Government is sufficiently aware of them. This time has now arrived for urgently proposing to the head of that Government to desist from further active operations against Montevideo.

The spirit in which I now address the Government of Buenos Ayres is not to be misconstrued as one of hostility either to this Government or the influential authority now at the head of it—on the contrary, the advice or recommendations that I am instructed to offer, are conceived in friendship, and in a true regard for the interests of this State.

It can scarcely be necessary for me to assure the Government of Buenos Ayres, that that of Her Majesty has neither selfish nor exclusive objects in view. The illustrious personage at the head of this Government will himself fully appreciate and acknowledge the true character of our proceedings.

In exhorting that personage to desist from a contest, in which (although he is in fact the chief or sole party that enables it to be carried on effectively) he is not directly interested, Her Majesty's Government disclaim all intention of interfering with the independence of Buenos Ayres; the right of this state to wage war like any other power is not disputed, provided that war be carried on in accordance with international law, and the custom of other civilized nations. But the war which the Argentine forces (and they alone effectually) now wage is a direct attack upon the independence of the State of Uruguay, and that independence Great Britain is by treaty bound to uphold. (France and Brazil are likewise pledged to support that independence.) It cannot be denied that the successful military operations of the Argentine forces have for their object to place the domestic Government of Montevideo in hands other than those which that state has itself elected. This alone would justify the interposition of a power under whose mediation the independence of Montevideo was established. Besides this war is without any national character or object as far as Buenos Ayres is concerned. The Argentine Government is professedly engaged in it, only as an auxiliary, not as a principal, and thus the Chief of that Government, particularly in the present successful position of his forces, may at once, not only without any sacrifice of honour and independence, but with a true sense of his own dignity and magnanimity, himself desire and accept, or make such proposals as might terminate—through the mediation of a friendly power—in a peaceful and generally advantageous cessation of the desolating and useless warfare now carried on.

I therefore earnestly entreat this Government thus to consider the question, and accepting the mediation now proffered, to settle on a firm basis the present contest, before it is too late to do so with dignity.

Let me not be misunderstood as adopting an unfriendly tone when I feel it my duty to represent to the Government of Buenos Ayres, that the time is come when the rejection of the present offers and

advice will assuredly involve it in difficulties and dangers, which would be extremely regretted by Her Majesty's Government, inasmuch as they could not but result in serious injury to the moral and political power of a Government at present consolidated, and with which Great Britain has constantly sustained, and is sincerely desirous to continue, the most amicable relations.

"Nor is it alone the claim of Montevideo to assistance in the preservation of her independence, but in addition the daily increasing losses which European interests are suffering, that call loudly on the Governments of Great Britain and France for intervention, while the barbarities that have stained the character of this contest have raised a feeling in Europe, to which it has become the duty of those Governments to respond, by conjointly resolving to employ every measure in their power, (if necessary,) to put an end to it.

"Although it is my duty to announce clearly to the Buenos Ayrean Government, that not only is this determination taken, but that the means of its accomplishment are at hand, I beg not to be misunderstood as making this communication in a minatory spirit; on the contrary, this must be regarded as an entirely confidential and friendly intimation, intended, and, I trust, fitted to induce this Government to anticipate, of its own free will, proposals which will otherwise be conjointly and formally made, and in a mode that may render the prompt acquiescence required, by actual circumstances less dignified, and apparently honourable than at present.

"I shall have strangely deviated from my instructions and intentions if I have so worded this kindly warning as to convey any other impression than that of an earnest desire to manifest the wishes of H. M.'s Government to avoid the necessity of adopting measures offensive to the dignity of a state with which Great Britain is so desirous of preserving her relations of friendship unbroken.

"The first step which, as H. M.'s Minister, I have to propose, is the withdrawal of the Argentine troops from the occupation of the Banda Oriental—which territory is now beyond dispute *de facto* in possession of a foreign state, (Buenos Ayres,)—and that the naval forces of this Government should be recalled from before Montevideo, or a suspension of hostilities, on conditions to be subsequently enforced, and of which the due execution might, under certain provisos, be guaranteed by Great Britain and France.

"It must be recollected that the honour of England and France, (as well as that of Brazil,) is pledged to preserve the independence of Montevideo; that on this point no compromise can be admitted, (nor do I apprehend, from what I have observed, that the Government of Buenos Ayres hesitates to acknowledge that independence;) but any mediation of Great Britain on this head must not be considered as espousing the cause of Montevideo against Buenos Ayres; on the contrary, any just cause of complaint against that state, or measures for preventing it from becoming the focus of political intrigues, or a harbour for other enemies of the Government of Buenos Ayres, will be duly taken into consideration.

"Strict impartiality in providing mutual security from future aggressions, require that the suggestions and wishes of the Government of Buenos Ayres should have their full weight.

"The object of Her Majesty's Government is to restore without further and dangerous delay peace and prosperity to the states of Rio de la Plata—the terms to be such as neither to offend their dignity or interests—and Great Britain offers her mediation with this view.

"Although H. M.'s Government acts, in the whole of this question, in perfect accord with that of France, yet, as the French Chargé d'Affaires has not hitherto received the necessary instructions from his Government, he is not at present empowered to act officially, in treating it with this Government; whereas I have full powers to enter upon the negotiation immediately, and to accept or make such proposals as are in accordance with the views that I have had the honour of submitting for consideration."

(Signed) "W. G. OUSELEY."

"Buenos Ayres, 10th May, 1845."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, on occasion of H. B. M.'s Minister having waited upon him on the day following the presentation of this memorandum, remarked to him the great difficulties offered by the different position taken by him according to it, and the insurmountable obstacles it threw in the way of pacification; that his demands and menaces had seriously called the attention of the Government, and that it was absolutely impossible for it to allow a minatory tone, so offensive to its dignity, to be employed with respect to it, and submissively to admit an intervention which it would resist at the cost of any sacrifice.

The British Minister acknowledged the force of these reasons, and stated that his intention in presenting the memorandum was to make known the views of his Government, but that he might in the sequel take another position, on his own responsibility, inasmuch as, having distinctly called the attention of Lord Aberdeen to the difficulties in which he might be placed on account of the distance, he was authorized to act independently of his instructions.

On the 17th May, H. B. M.'s Minister withdrew the memorandum, stating that, on his own responsibility, he took a new position more in accordance with the present state of things.

In these circumstances, it being known on the 18th May, that the French Government had already appointed the Baron Deffaudis to be their Envoy, Mr. Ouseley proposed to address to the Argentine Government a note, the rough draft of which bore date the 12th of May, but which was not actually delivered by him to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, till the 18th.

He stated in it that, having had the honor of conversing on more than one occasion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the pacification which it was expected to be able to bring to a satisfactory arrangement, and being sensible that the Argentine Government desired as much as that of H. B. M. its accomplishment upon solid and honourable bases, he requested to be informed more fully what immediate measures would be recommended or adopted by the Argentine Government for the attainment of the object which both Governments had in view.

The explanations continued in the most friendly terms, without any disagreement, Mr. Ouseley evincing also a disposition to come to an understanding with President Oribe upon the subject of the affairs of the pacification.

In the circumstances came the arrival of Baron Deffaudis, and the British Minister proposed to the Argentine Government to antedate the correspondence of the month of May and beginning of June. A note of his, of the 21st May, was handed in by him on the 28th, and he requested that the answer of the Government should bear the date of the 24th, previous to the arrival of M. Bourboulon. He added that it was of importance to him that it should be done so in order to enable him to come to an understanding with Baron Deffaudis; and that he was

(See next page.)

MERCHANT VESSELS

IN THE PORT OF BUENOS AYRES ON THURSDAY LAST.
For Arrivals and Sailings of Friday—See Marine List.

Date of Arrival.	Vessels and Captains Names.	Tons.	Consignees.	Destinations, &c.
British.				
May 2	Brig Richard Watson, Seals.	181	Santamaria, Lambi & Co.	Liverpool.
June 16	Brig Belta Fortuna, John Wm. Pyott.	235	Parian, Macalister & Co.	Plymouth.
21	Brig Melody, John Hooper.	252	Hughes Brothers.	Falmouth.
July 7	Brig Camilla, Daniel Kennell.	148	Hughes, Brothers.	London.
7	Brig James Orr, William Martin.	181	Macdonald, Dale & Co.	London.
18	Barque New Pink, John Poyntz.	219	Charles Tayleur & Co.	London.
Aug. 4	Barque Samuel Baker, F. Longlois.	209	Henry & George Dowse.	Liverpool.
12	Brig Ann, Lumley Kennedy.	208	Brownell, Stegmann & Co.	London.
19	Brig James Duncan, Daniel England.	241	Nicholson, Green & Co.	London.
22	Brig United, Amice Berteaut.	208	Bertram, LeBreton & Delisle.	London.
22	Barque Caledonia, Moore.	208	John Galt Smith & Co.	London.
American.				
Aug. 3	Barque Chancelor, A. Beauvais.	277	Francis Dominick.	New York.
3	Barque Wimpac, John Mitchell.	340	Samuel B. Hale.	Boston.
3	Schooner Sarah Ann, P. Stevenson.	60	Jacob Paravicini.	Buenos Ayres.
4	Brig Falconer, Charles W. Danison.	252	Daniel Gowlind & Co.	Buenos Ayres.
5	Barq. Margaret Hugg, William Litton.	327	Jacob Paravicini.	Buenos Ayres.
13	Brig Tweed, W. G. Hands.	306	Daniel Gowlind & Co.	Buenos Ayres.
French.				
July 17	Brig Eugénie Jenny, Guerin.	158	Joseph Bazain.	Cette.
23	Ship Paquetot des Mers du Sud, F. Cotineau.	312	Chapeaurouge & Co.	Havre de Grace.
24	Brig Henri & Louise, J. P. Gautier.	192	Harttholme Herand.	Cette.
Aug. 12	Barque L'aronne, Felix Larché.	214	Vigual & Sons.	Marseilles.
14	Brig Petrus, Jaime Lemarsquier.	170	Vignal & Sons.	Cette.
20	Ship Parana, Leconte.	256	Ochoa & Co.	Havre de Grace.
Sardinian.				
June 14	Schooner Thalia, Juan Bautista Vassallo.	63	Jacinto Caprile.	Genoa.
14	Polacre Vencedora, Pablo Purodi.	147	John Jacob Klick & Co.	Genoa.
15	Polacre Napoleon, Nirok Bahardy.	227	Jacinto Caprile.	Genoa.
16	Brigantine Agata, Juan B. Dalorso.	121	Pietranera, Piaggio & Co.	Brazil.
17	Brig Capricioso, Jacome Capello.	155	Jacinto Caprile.	Brazil.
Aug. 6	Schooner Atrevida, G. Sacconi.	121	Lezica & Co.	Brazil.
23	Barque Maria Eugenia, C. Lassolo.	224	Zumaran & Treserra.	Brazil.
7	Polacre Narciso, Juan Vassallo.	166	Pietranera, Piaggio & Co.	Brazil.
Spanish.				
July 7	Polacre Juanita, Narciso Marcia.	179	Llavallol & Sons.	Havana.
7	Brig Manuel, Pedro Garcia.	155	Zumaran & Treserra.	Havana.
13	Brig Arturo, José Ricoma.	206	Santamaria, Lambi & Co.	Havana.
15	Brig Unco, Antonio Roig.	168	Pedro Antonio Sanchez.	Havana.
21	Brig Paquete de Buenos Ayres, F. G. Veiga.	185	Geronimo S. de la Maza.	Havana.
Aug. 4	Brig Fortuna, Silvio Sano.	232	Llavallol & Sons.	Malgas.
7	Brig Esperanza, Pedro Guardiola.	180	Llavallol & Sons.	Malgas.
25	Brig Vencedor, Juan Roses.	182	Llavallol & Sons.	Malgas.
Brazilian.				
June 20	Brig Lucia, Joaquin Ferreyrados Santos.	170	Sa Pereira & Meyrelles.	Brazil.
July 5	Polacre Virginia, Alvaro Jacques Nicos.	152	Juan Balbino Soriano.	do.
16	Brigantine Bonito Porto, A. B. Oliveira.	129	Juan Geronimo Martinez.	do.
16	Brig Oceano, A. J. A. de Cunha.	165	Juan Geronimo Martinez.	do.
21	Brig Belisario, Manuel da Silva Santos.	232	Manuel Azevedo Ramos.	do.
Aug. 5	Brig Tres Guimaraes, A. G. Viana.	172	João Marques de Sousa.	do.
18	Brigantine Cabouca, F. G. Oliveira.	104	Zumaran & Treserra.	do.
Danish.				
Jan. 10	Schooner Alfred, George Nielsen.	198	Thode & Co.	Antwerp.
July 7	Brig Emma, Notton Olsen.	164	Charles R. Horne.	Antwerp.
11	Brig Ernest, Peter Knudsen.	209	Thode & Co.	Antwerp.
14	Schooner Elina, A. E. Asnonden.	127	Freyer, Brothers.	Havana.
16	Brig Thornwaldsen, Frederick Stage.	232	Mohr, Ludovici & Co.	Antwerp.
17	Brig Counter, C. F. Thomsen.	120	Charles R. Horne.	Havana.
31	Brig Margaretha, Johans H. Jorgan.	151	Thode & Co.	Hamburg.
Aug. 4	Brig Esperanza, Johanna J.W. Wittasen.	86	Thode & Co.	Antwerp.
6	Brig Meitta, B. Moller.	120	Egg, Krutish & Co.	Falmouth.
	Brig Emilie, E. F. Hasberier.	196	Fers, Malcolm & Co.	Havana.
Hamburgh.				
July 16	Erq. Laura & Louisa, C. H. F. Mercks.	300	Thode & Co.	Altona.
Aug. 4	Barque Antoinette, Henry Bahr.	178	Zimmermann, Frazier & Co.	Hamburg.
6	Brigantine Express, J. D. Cohrs.	110	Lewis Winter.	Falmouth.
Dutch.				
July 16	Ship Anna, Kunst.	460	Bunge, Hutz & Co.	Antwerp.
Portuguese.				
July 15	Schnr. Joven de Lima, A. G. Avellar.	130	Juan Geronimo Mariaez.	Brazil.
Prussian.				
Aug. 3	Barque Herzog Bogislaw, J. F. Jaeger.	250	Bunge, Hutz & Co.	Havana.
Swedish.				
June 19	Brig. Experiment, F. Reutercona.	200	Zimmermann, Frazier & Co.	Hamburg.
Aug. 3	Brigantine Orion, Nicolas Larsson.	110	Manuel Azevedo Ramos.	Cette.
Bremen.				
July 17	Brigantine Orient, D. Stege.	150	John Jacob Klick & Co.	Hamburg.
Belgian.				
July 18	Brig Windhond, E. Langhetee.	204	Charles R. Horne.	Antwerp.
Hanoverian.				
July 17	Brigantine Heinrich, Johann Haesloop.	126	Jacob Paravicini.	Hamburg.

FOREIGN VESSELS OF WAR.

BRITISH—Gorgon, steam sloop, Captain Charles Hotham
Brig Dolphin, 3 guns, Lieut. Reginald Thomas John Levinge, *Commander*
BRAZILIAN—Brig Capiberibe, 16 guns, Captain Antonio F. Pereira de Melo.
Brigantine Olinda, 10 guns, Captain Amazonas.

MARINE LIST

PORT OF BUENOS AYRES.

Errata in our last:—In the cargo of the Rose, for 3128 dry ox and cow hides, & 11,824 salted do., read 11,824 dry ox and cow hides, and 3128 salted do.
In the cargo of the Encantador, for 3000 quintals jerked beef, read 2370.

August 22.—Wind N.

Arrived, Sardinian barque Maria Eugenia, 224 tons, Carlos Lassolo, from Parnagua 2nd inst., with yerba, &c., to Zumaran & Treserra.
Sailed, Brazilian corvette Bertioira, 18 guns, Captain William Parker, for Montevideo.

National brig General Belgrano, Juan Guerrero, for Falmouth for orders, despatched by A. C. Santamaria, Liambi & Cambaceres, with 3000 salted ox and cow hides, 30 tone hoois, 2 do. bones, 445 pipes with 16,910 arrobas tallow, 14 bales with 140 quintals hide cuttings, 11 do. with 300 dozen sheep skins, 2 do. with 60 arrobas hair.

August 24.—Wind N.N.W.—strong.

No arrivals or sailings.

August 25.—Wind S.W.

Arrived, Spanish brig Vencedor, 182 tons, Juan Roses, from Barcelona 13th May, Malaga 8th June, Rio Janeiro 4th inst., with part cargo, to Liavallol & Sons.

British barque Caledonia, Moore, from Liverpool and Montevideo, to John Galt Smith & Co., with general cargo, but from having called at Montevideo she was not allowed entry here.

Sailed, Sardinian schooner Nuestra Señora del Huerto, Agustin Ecaride, for Rio Grande, despatched by Rugh & Co., in ballast and with passengers.

Sardinian schooner Paz, Sebastian Dalorso, for Rio Grande, despatched by Carlos Maria Huerge, in ballast, and with passengers.

British brig Cybele, John Fitchet, for London, despatched by Stanley, Black & Co., with 6,409 salted ox and cow hides, 8,000 horns, 43,000 shin bones, 1954 pipes, with 7,400 arrobas tallow, 1,156 salted horse hides, 64 bales, with 1,500 arrobas wool, 59 do., with 1,600 arrobas hair, 15 do., with 11,250 lbs. nutria skins.

August 26.—Wind E.S.E.

No arrivals.

Sailed, H. B. M's. Packet schooner Spider, 6 guns, Lieut. Richard Elsworth Pym, Commander, for Montevideo and Rio Janeiro.

Passengers for Montevideo.—Messrs. C. Croker, A. Brittain, Bailey, &c.

August 27.—Wind N.

Arrived, Sardinian polacre Narciso, 186 tons, Juan Vasallo, from Bahia, 30th ult., with rum, sugar, &c. to Pietranera, Piaggio & Co.

Sailed, Bremen barque Maria Albina, Johann Haesloop, for Bremen, despatched by Bunge, Hutz & Co., with 15,910 dry ox and cow hides, 1,000 salted do., 12 bales, with 350 arrobas horse hair.

American barque Rosabella, George E. Bailey, for Salem, despatched by Daniel Gowland & Co., with 7,224 dry ox and cow hides, 1,450 salted do., 8,000 horns, 96 bales, with 2,881 arrobas wool, 50 do., with 1,910 arrobas hair, 10 do., with 224 doz. sheep skins, 1 do., with 50 doz. goat skins, 6 do., with 1,100 doz. nutria skins.

H. B. M's. brigantine Dolphin, on a cruise.

August 28.—Wind N.

Arrived, H. B. M's. brigantine Dolphin, from a cruise.

Sailed, Swedish brig Minona, Charles L. Lundgren, for Altona, despatched by Charles R. Horne, with 12,008 dry ox and cow hides.

August 29.—Wind S.E.—strong.

Arrived, H. B. M's. steam frigate Firebrand, Captain James Hope, from Montevideo, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Samuel Hood Ingfield.

American brig Olinda, 178 tons, Samuel Hutchinson, from Salem 4th June, Cape de Verdes 16th July, with salt, &c., to Daniel Gowland & Co.

National polacre Bella Union, 121 tons, (late Mina) Lazaro Boinfante, from Santa Catalina, 16h inst., with yerba, &c., to Risso & Rosa.

British barque Clio, 216 tons, John Legrand, from Cadiz, 13th July, with salt, to Nicholson, Green & Co.

British schooner brig

Brazilian schooner brig

Brazilian schooner brig

Sailed, H. B. M. steamers Firebrand and Gorgon, and brigantine Dolphin, for Colonia.

The British brigs Winescales and Anemone remain wind bound.

(Continued from third page.)

anxious to receive that answer for the purpose of forwarding it to his Government, and of being prepared to state the same to Baron Deffauld, upon whose arrival it would be embarrassing to him not to have it. The object he represented to have in view with this document was to give his Government to understand that he had already established a pacific and friendly negotiation, without experiencing any difficulties on the part of the Argentine Government. The note alluded to, under date of the 21st of May, was couched in these terms:—

"Buenos Ayres, May 21, 1845.

"The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, referring to the different official and confidential conferences and communications respecting the measures to be adopted for the pacification of the States of the Rio de la Plata, with which he has been honoured by Señor Arana, Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, finds, with much satisfaction, that the Argentine Government 1st. Acknowledge as fully as Her Majesty's Government the Independence of the Oriental State of the Uruguay:—

"2d. That the Government of Buenos Ayres repudiates unconditionally all interference with the internal and domestic Government of the Oriental State:—

"3d. That, under certain conditions, the Argentine Government will cause its troops to withdraw from the Banda Oriental:—

"4th. That the blockade of Montevideo will, (under condition hereafter to be fixed), be raised:—

"5th. That the personal safety of the political refugees of all parties will, as far as regards the Argentine Government, be assured, pending and subsequent to the negotiations which it is hoped will terminate in the pacification on solid bases of the States of the Rio de la Plata. The conditions upon which the three last of the points would be accepted by the Argentine Government, appeared by the undersigned to be referred by H. E. Señor Arana, for discussion with General Oribe.

"That respecting the blockade of Montevideo the Argentine Government insists (as a measure which its dignity as an independent nation requires) upon its unconditional recognition, in the most rigorous form, as the first step in the negotiation.

"The undersigned, reserving all examination of the above conditions, requests that Señor Arana will do him the honour of informing him whether the Argentine Government is prepared, at once, to act on these general bases, or whether H. E. has any further measures or conditions to propose, which, in the opinion of the Argentine Government, might facilitate and secure the objects of the two Governments in the pacification of the States of the Rio de la Plata.

"The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to H. E. the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed) "W. G. OUSELEY."
"To His Excellency
"SEÑOR D. FELIPE DE ARANA, &c. &c."

Official intelligence has been received, that the remnants of Mascarilla's forces were overtaken by General Echagüe, on the 12th inst., at the Pass of S. Gerónimo, in the Chaco, and completely destroyed; Mascarilla escaping with only two or three followers. On the arrival of this important news, the battery fired a salute, and the church bells rang a merry peal.

In consequence of the blockade of the Buceo by the Anglo-French naval forces, President Oribe has declared several places in the River Yaguaron, and other parts of the Rio Grande frontier, to be ports of entry.

On the 11th inst., the legal Chambers of the Oriental Republic, which were dissolved by Rivera with the assistance of the French Agents, in 1838, re-assembled, in the vicinity of Montevideo; when President Oribe made a full exposé of the state of the public affairs.

The Commercial Rooms will in future be closed at the hours ordained in the decree of the 26th inst.

CRATORIO.

A repetition of the Oratorio of the *Creation* took place on Wednesday Evening last, at the North American Chapel, which we can only at present thus cursorily notice and state, that amongst the brilliant assemblage to hear those "divine strains," were the daughter of H. E. the Governor, the lady of General Mancilla, Baron Mareuil, Chargé d'Affaires of France, and the Gentlemen of the French Legation, Baron Picote D'Hermillon, Consul General of Sardinia, &c.

By way of Rio Janeiro we learn two items of intelligence, which we think will be interesting to many of our readers.

General Jackson, ex-President of the U. S., died on the 8th June, at the age of 78 years.

General Santa Ana, ex-President of Mexico, banished, arrived at Havana on the 7th June.

The Weather has been seasonable this week.

THERMOMETER in the Mirador of the Commercial Room since our last:—

Saturday.....	45
Sunday.....	54
Monday.....	54
Tuesday.....	46
Wednesday.....	46
Thursday.....	58
Friday.....	51

Foreign Merchant Vessels in the Port of Buenos Ayres on the evening of the 29th inst.

British.....	15
American.....	7
French.....	7
Spanish.....	8
Sardinian.....	8
Brazilian.....	9
Danish.....	10
Prussian.....	1
Swedish.....	2
Bremen.....	1
Dutch.....	1
Hanoverian.....	1
Belgian.....	1
Portuguese.....	1
Hamburg.....	3

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Advertisements.

Notice.

ALL persons having claims against the Estate of the late Mr. JOHN BURKE, will please present the same forthwith for adjustment, and all those indebted thereto are requested to call and settle their accounts, at No. 77 Calle de Cangallo, within one month from this date.
Buenos Ayres, August 29th, 1845.

DANIEL MAXWELL, } Executors.
JAMES KIERKMAN, }

Sale by Auction.

MESSRS. IBARRA & MACOBE will sell by Public Auction, on Tuesday, the 2d September, at 11 o'clock, at the House of Mr. W. A. Rhodes, No. 173 Calle de Universidad, his furniture, china, glass and crockery ware, comprising a general list of household articles, all in good order, and which will be sold without reserve, as the owner is about to leave the country. Also, a first rate London made upright piano-forte, likewise several historical and scriptural paintings, by several eminent Flemish artists, a small library, containing some valuable English books, &c. For particulars see daily papers.

PRICES CURRENT.

Doublons, Spanish.....	8	255	each
Do Patriot.....	240	245	do.
Plata, masequina.....	12	13	do. for one
Dollars, Spanish.....	15	16	each.
Do. Patriot & Patatoes.....	143	15	do.
Six per cent. Stock.....	70	72	do. per cent.
Exchange on England.....	31	33	do.
Do. France.....	37	39	cent. per dollar
Do. Rio Janeiro.....	14	15	per ct. premium
Do. Montevideo.....	4	5	do. do.
Do. United States.....	11	15	per U. S. dol.
Hides, Ox, for Engld & Germy.....	55	58	per pessada.
Do. France.....	45	50	do.
Do. North America.....	45	46	do.
Do. Spain.....	51	56	do.
Do. salted.....	42	48	do.
Do. Horse.....	20	22	do. each
Calf skins.....	45	47	per pessada
Sheep skins, common.....	33	34	per dozen
Do. fine.....	36	38	do.
Deer skins.....	10	11	do.
Goat skins.....	26	30	do.
Nutria skins.....	5	51	dol. per lb
Chinchilli skins.....	70	40	per dozen.
Horse hair, short.....	38	40	dol. per arroba
Do. mixed.....	45	46	do.
Do. long.....	100	110	do.
Wool, common, washed.....	22	30	do.
Do. picked.....	35	40	do.
Do. shorn from skins.....	25	40	do.
Do. mestiza, thiry.....	20	30	do.
Tallow, pure.....	15	20	do.
Do. raw.....	113	12	do.
Do. with grease.....	15	17	do.
Jack-boef.....	26	40	per quintal.
Horns, mixed.....	100	150	per thousand.
Do. C.....	50	500	do.
Shin bones.....	70	80	do.
Hide cuttings.....	24	26	per 100 lbs.
Ostrich feathers, white.....	9	10	per lb.
Do. black.....	8	83	do.
Salt-d tongues.....	7	8	per dozen.
Salt, on board.....	18	20	per fanega.
Discount.....	18	21	per ct. pr. month

The highest price of Doublons during the week 260 dollars. The lowest price 240 dollars. The highest rate of Exchange upon England during the week 21 pence. The lowest ditto 31 pence.

GEORGE THOMAS, Responsible Editor.