

AND

## ARGENTINE NEWS.

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BUENOS AYRES, SATURDAY, MAY 13, 1854.

(Established in 1826.)

### Foreign Intelligence.

#### THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"Palace of the Tuilleries, Jan. 29 1854.  
"Sire,—The difference which has arisen between your Majesty and the Ottoman Porte has assumed such a grave aspect, that I think it right myself to explain directly to your Majesty the part which France has taken in this question, and the means which suggest themselves to me in order to avoid the dangers which menace the tranquillity of Europe.

"The note which your Majesty has just sent to my Government, and that of Queen Victoria, endeavours to prove that it was the system of pressure adopted from the commencement by the two maritime Powers which alone involved the question in bitterness. On the contrary, according to my view, the matter would have continued a Cabinet question if the occupation of the two Principalities had not suddenly transferred it from the region of discussion to that of fact, and, nevertheless, although your Majesty's troops had entered Wallachia, we advised the Porte not to consider that occupation as a warlike act, thus proving our extreme desire for conciliation. After I had consulted with England, Austria, and Prussia, I proposed to your Majesty a note, designed to give satisfaction to all. Your Majesty accepted it. We had hardly, however, been informed of this good news when your Minister, by explanatory commentaries, destroyed all the conciliatory effects of it, and thus prevented us from insisting at Constantinople upon its pure and simple adoption. The Porte, for its own part, suggested some modifications in the note, to which the representatives of the four Powers at Vienna, were not indisposed to agree. They were not, however, agreed to by your Majesty. It was then that the Porte, wounded in its dignity, its independence threatened, and being compelled to raise an army to oppose that of your Majesty, preferred to declare war rather than remain in a state of uncertainty and humility. The Porte had claimed our support; the cause of the Porte appeared to us to be a just one, and the English and French squadrons were therefore ordered to the Bosphorus.

"Our attitude in reference to Turkey was that of a protector, but it was passive. We did not incite her to war. We unceasingly addressed to the ears of the Sultan the advice of peace and moderation, persuaded that this was the best mode of coming to an agreement, and the four Powers consulted together again, and submitted to your Majesty some other propositions. Your Majesty, on your part, exhibiting the eagerness which arises from the consciousness of strength, contented yourself with repulsing from the left bank of the Danube, as in Asia, the attacks of the Turks; and, with the moderation worthy of the chief of a great empire, your Majesty declared that you would act on the defensive. Up to that period, then, we were, I may say, interested spectators, but simply spectators, of the dispute, when the affair of Sinope compelled us to take a more decisive part. France and England had not thought it necessary to send troops to the assistance of Turkey. Their flag, therefore, was not engaged in the conflicts which took place upon land. But at sea it was very different. There were at the entrance to the Bosphorus 3,000 guns, the existence of which proclaimed loudly enough to Turkey that the two leading maritime Powers would not allow her to be attacked by sea. The affair at Sinope was for us as painful as it was unexpected; for it matters little to us whether or not the Turks wished to convey munitions of war to the Russian territory. In fact, Russian ships attacked Turkish vessels in the waters of Turkey, when those vessels were riding quietly at anchor in a Turkish port. The Turkish vessels were destroyed, in spite of the assurance that there was no wish to commence an aggressive war, and in spite of the vicinity of our squadrons. It was no longer our policy which received a check, it was our military honour. The sound of the cannon-shot at Sinope reverberated painfully in the hearts of all those who in England and in France respect national dignity. There was a general participation in the sentiment that wherever our cannon can reach our allies ought to be respected. Out of this feeling arose the order given to our squadrons to enter the Black Sea, and to prevent by force, if necessary, the recurrence of a similar event. Thence arose the collective notification sent to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, announcing that if we prevented the

Turks from making an aggressive war upon the coasts of Russia, we would also protect the Turks upon their own territory. As to the Russian fleet, in prohibiting its navigation of the Black Sea, we placed it upon a different condition because it was important during the war to preserve a guarantee equivalent in force to the occupation of the Turkish territory, and thus facilitate the conclusion of peace by having the power of making a desirable exchange.

"Such, Sire, is the real result and a statement of the facts. It is clear that, having arrived at this point, they must either bring about a definitive understanding or a decided rupture.

"Your Majesty has given so many proofs of your solicitude for the tranquillity of Europe, and by your beneficent influence has so powerfully arrested the spirit of disorder, that I cannot doubt as to the course you will take in the alternative which presents itself to your choice. Should your Majesty be as desirous as myself of a pacific conclusion, what would be more simple than to declare that an armistice shall now be signed, that things shall resume their diplomatic course, that all hostilities shall cease, and that the belligerent forces shall return from the places to which motives of war have led them?

"Thus the Russian troops would abandon the principalities, and our squadrons the Black Sea. Your Majesty, preferring to treat directly with Turkey, might appoint an Ambassador, who could negotiate with a Plenipotentiary of the Sultan a convention which might be submitted to a conference of the four Powers. Let your Majesty adopt this plan, upon which the Queen of England and myself are perfectly agreed, and tranquillity will be re-established and the world satisfied. There is nothing in the plan which is unworthy of your Majesty,—nothing which can wound your honour; but if, from a motive difficult to understand, your Majesty should refuse this proposal, then France, as well as England, will be compelled to leave to the fate of arms and the chances of war that which might now be decided by reason and justice.

"Let not your Majesty think that the least animosity can enter my heart. I feel no other sentiments than those expressed by your Majesty yourself in your letter of the 17th of January, 1853, in which you write, 'Our relations ought to be sincerely amicable, based, as they are, upon the same intentions—the maintenance of order, the love of peace, respect for treaties, and reciprocal good feeling. This programme is worthy of the Sovereign who traced it, and I do not hesitate to declare that I remain faithful to it.' 'I beg your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of my sentiments, and it is with these sentiments that,

"I am, Sire, your Majesty's good friend

"NAPOLEON."

#### THE EMPEROR'S REPLY.

"St. Petersburg, Jan. 29 (Feb. 9).  
"Sire,—I cannot better reply to your Majesty than by repeating, as they belong to me, the words with which your letter terminates, our relations ought to be sincerely amicable and should be based upon the same intentions—the maintenance of order, the love of peace, respect for treaties, and reciprocal good feeling. Your Majesty, in accepting this programme, as I had traced it, says that you remain faithful to it. I dare believe and my conscience tell me so, that I have not exceeded its limits; for in the affair which has excited division between us, the origin of which is not to be attributed to me, I have always sought to maintain friendly relations with France, and I have always endeavoured to avoid any thing that might clash with the religion professed by your Majesty. I have made for the maintenance of peace all the concessions both of form and substance compatible with my honour, and, in claiming for my religionists in Turkey the confirmation of the rights and privileges which they have long acquired at the price of Russian blood, I claimed nothing which was not confirmed by treaties. If the Porte had been left to herself, the difference which has so long kept Europe in suspense would have been solved. A fatal influence has thrown everything into confusion. By provoking gratuitous suspicions, and by exciting the fanaticism of the Turks, and by deceiving their government as to my intentions and the real scope of my demands, it has so exaggerated the extent of the questions that the probable result seems to be war. Your Majesty must allow me not to enter too much in detail into the circumstances as they present themselves to you in your

letter, in which those circumstances are marked out. Several acts on my part, appreciated with little accuracy, according to my opinion, and more than one fact perverted, would require, in order to be properly rectified, at least as I conceive, long developments into which it would not be proper to enter in a correspondence between Sovereign and Sovereign. For instance, your Majesty attributes to the occupation of the principalities the evil of having suddenly transported the question from the region of discussion to that of fact; but your Majesty leaves out of view the circumstance that this occupation, still purely conditional, was preceded, and in a great measure caused by a very important previous fact—the appearance of the combined fleet in the vicinity of the Dardanelles; and, besides this, much before that period when England hesitated to assume a hostile attitude, your Majesty took the initiative in sending your fleet as far as Salamis. This wounding demonstration certainly exhibited little confidence in me. It was calculated to encourage the Turks; and to paralyse beforehand the success of negotiations by giving them the idea that France and England were ready to support their cause under all circumstances. In the same way your Majesty makes it appear that the explanatory commentaries of my cabinet, upon the Vienna note rendered it impossible for France and England to recommend its adoption by the Porte; but your Majesty may recollect that our commentaries followed, and did not precede, the pure and simple non-acceptance of the note, and I believe that the powers were so little seriously desirous of peace that they confined themselves to the claims of the pure and simple adoption of that note, instead of allowing the Porte to modify what we had previously adopted with our change. Besides, if any point of our commentaries had given rise to difficulties, I offered satisfactory solution to them at Olmutz, and such was it considered by Austria and Prussia. Unfortunately, in the interval, a part of the Anglo-French fleet had already entered the Dardanelles, under the pretext of there protecting the lives and properties of English and French subjects; and in order to allow the whole to enter, without violating the treaty of 1841, it was necessary that the Ottoman government should declare war against us. My opinion is, that if France and England had desired peace as much as I, they would at any cost have prevented that declaration of war, or, when war was declared, have taken care that it should have been restrained within the narrow limits within which I wished to confine it on the Danube, so that I might not be compelled by force to abandon the purely defensive system which I wished to adopt. But from the moment when the Turks were allowed to attack our Asiatic territory, to carry away one of our frontier posts (even before the term fixed for the commencement of hostilities), to blockade Akhalkizik, and to ravage the province of Armenia,—from the moment when the Turkish fleet were allowed to transport troops, arms, and munitions of war to our coasts, could it be reasonably hoped that we should wait patiently the result of such an attempt? Was it not to be supposed that we should do all we could to prevent that? The affair of Sinope was the result of it. That affair was the forced consequence of the attitude adopted by the two powers, and the result certainly could not have been unexpected. I had declared my wish to remain upon the defensive, but before war broke out, as far as my honour and my interest could permit me to do so, and so long as the war was restrained within certain limits. Has all been done which ought to have been done to prevent these limits being exceeded? If the character of spectator, or even that of mediator, was not sufficient for your Majesty, and if your Majesty wished to become the armed auxiliary of my enemies, then, Sire, it would have been more honourable and more worthy of you to have told me so frankly beforehand by declaring war against me. Each of us would then, have known the part he had to play. But is it an equitable proceeding for those to make a crime of that event after it has happened which they did nothing to prevent? If the cannon shot of Sinope reverberated painfully on the hearts of all those who in France and in England appreciate the national dignity, does your Majesty think that the menacing presence at the entrance of the Bosphorus of the three thousand pieces of cannon of which you speak, and the report of their entry into the Black Sea, remain without echo in the hearts of the nation whose honour I have to defend? I learn from your Majesty for the first time [for the verbals declarations made

to me up to this period have made no such allusion], that while protecting the reinforcement of Turkish troops upon their own territory, the two powers have resolved to prohibit to us the navigation of the Black Sea—that is to say, apparently, to take from us the right of strengthening our own coasts. I leave it to your Majesty to consider if that be, as you say, the way to facilitate the conclusion of peace, and if in the alternative which is placed before me I am permitted to discuss, or even to examine for a moment, your proposal of an armistice, the immediate evacuation of the principalities, and the negotiation with the Porte for a convention to be submitted to a conference of the four powers? Would you yourself, Sire, if you were in my place, accept such a proposition? Would your national feeling allow you to do so? I boldly answer, no. Allow me then, in my turn, the right of thinking as you would think yourself. Whatever your Majesty may decide, my menaces will not induce me to recede. My confidence is in God and in my right, and Russia, as I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812. If, however, your Majesty, less indifferent to my honour, should frankly return to our programme—if you should proffer me a cordial hand, and I now offer it to you at this last moment—I will willingly forget whatever has wounded my feelings in the past. Then, Sire, but then only we may discuss, and perhaps we may come to an understanding. Let your fleet limit itself to preventing the Turks from sending additional forces to the theatre of war. I willingly promise that they shall have nothing to fear from my attempts. Let them send a negotiator. I will receive him in a suitable manner, the conditions are known at Vienna. That is the only basis upon which I can allow discussion.

"I beg your Majesty to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments with which I am, "Sire, your Majesty's good friend.

"NICOLAS."

#### BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

Mr. HUME wished to bring a question of considerable importance under the notice of the First Lord of the Admiralty. He hoped that, considering the advantages which the seamen employed in the mercantile marine enjoyed in some respects over those serving in the Royal navy, the Government would not hesitate to make a fair and reasonable advance, if it should be deemed necessary, and in every other way that they would insure as much as possible the comfort of the men.

Sir J. GRAHAM said, that some short time back the House had consented to a considerable increase in the pay of the sailor, and also that the Board of Admiralty had reconsidered the question of secondary punishments, and the result had been that they had thought it desirable to mitigate their severity, and he was glad to be able to state that crime was on the decrease. The result of the endeavour to raise additional seamen had been most satisfactory. Without any bounty, and notwithstanding the extraordinary rise in the wages which sailors obtained in some branches of the mercantile marine since the House had voted, in the month of November, 1852, an increase of 5l. to the pay of the sailor, 7,000 seamen and 1,500 marines had been raised voluntarily. That circumstance appeared to him to show that at the present time no necessity existed of giving a bounty. If indeed a bounty were given, it would only be right that all men in active service should receive it, and the expense of paying it would be enormous. In the month of February last 900 seamen entered voluntarily, and now that sailors believed active service to be approaching, volunteering was going on in a most satisfactory manner.

Sir G. PEACHELL agreed with the right hon. baronet that there was no necessity for giving a bounty to induce seamen to enter. They had waited to see if the Emperor of Russia was really in earnest, and now that they saw a good chance of active service they had come forward. He was glad that the experiment of calling the coastguard men into service had been successful, and he thought that circumstances might lead to deficits being pointed out which ought not to exist. It was intended when the coastguard service was established that it should consist of sailors who received good characters from ships just paid off; but he feared that there were at present men in that force who did not even know how to sling their hammocks. He had the strongest hope, and indeed, he firmly believed that in the impending struggle the ships and seamen of this country would do their duty, for there was





